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This article examines Turkish–EU relations and the Cyprus issue within the
Europeanization framework. It seeks to underline how and to what extent EU
conditionality was performed in Turkey’s Cyprus policy in the post-Helsinki
period. The exploration of the relationship between domestic political pressures
and the foreign policy choices of the AKP government on the Cyprus issue sug-
gests that EU’s potential in transforming the foreign policy of candidates is both
context dependent and questionable. Alongside EU-related factors such as the
credible membership perspective, what accounts for change is predominantly
determined by how domestic actors perceive it, and how much domestic power
struggles are affected by it.
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Introduction
Over the last decade, discussion has widely concentrated on the term ‘Europeaniza-
tion’ in researching the EU’s potential to affect several policy areas, including the
foreign policy, of its members and candidate states (Grabbe 2001, 2002 2003,
2006; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005, 2007). The lure of membership does
indeed enable the EU to promote changes in candidate states’ foreign policy. The
academic scholarship on Turkish–EU relations overwhelmingly concentrates on
issues about the pace of Turkey’s domestic transformation due to EU candidacy
(EU-induced change, lack of change, and backlash) with reference to the ups and
downs in relations between the two (Müftüler-Baç 2005, 2008; Narbonne and Tocci
2009; Ulusoy and Verney 2009); the EU’s accession dynamics in relation to the
transformation of the Cyprus conflict (Tocci 2002, 2003, 2005; Müftüler-Baç and
Güney 2005; Ulusoy 2008); and the EU’s role in conflict resolution concerning the
Cyprus dispute (Diez and Tocci 2009). There is also an emerging literature on
Turkish Europeanization, addressing the limits of the EU’s transformative power
and whether the Europeanization approach needs further qualification in the Turkish
case (Börzel 2012; Nas and Özer 2012). Looking through different theoretical
lenses such as rational choice institutionalist and/or sociological institutionalist
(Terzi 2010, 2012; Nas 2012; Yılmaz 2012), as well as examining discursive
accounts (Kaliber 2012), scholars of Turkish Europeanization converge on the idea
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that the EU’s domestic impact on Turkey shows significant variation when
discussing certain policy areas (Terzi 2010, 2012; İzci 2012; Kaliber 2012;
Macmillan 2012; Tsarouhas 2012), actors (Öniş 2009; Öner 2012; Terzi 2010) and
issues (Özer 2012; Yılmaz 2012). Moreover, it is generally observed in those stud-
ies that EU conditionality and the credibility of the accession perspective have been
widely studied as foreign policy pressure, yet, the role of domestic actors and/or
factors in relation to conditionality and the accession process in inducing domestic
change have been either eliminated (Aydın and Açıkmeşe 2007; Müftüler-Baç and
Gürsoy 2010; Oğuzlu 2010) or overestimated (Kaliber 2012). Although the bulk of
those studies are stimulating, they fall short of addressing the complex interactive
pattern between the EU and domestic levels, which in fact lies at the heart of more
recent Europeanization studies (Börzel 2012).
In contrast, building on the rational choice variant of neo-institutionalism, this
article departs from existing scholarship practice to tackle the questions of ‘how’
and ‘to what extent’ the EU generates changes in accession states’ foreign policies
by exploring how the EU impacted Turkey’s Cyprus policy between 1999 and
2012. This article argues that among so many hurdles on Turkey’s journey to the
EU, the Cyprus problem occupies a special place because different EU bodies have
consistently put pressure on Ankara to recognize the ‘Republic of Cyprus’ and to
withdraw Turkish troops from the island. To what extent can the ‘EU anchor’ lead
to change in Turkey’s Cyprus policy, in view of its candidacy dating from 1999
and accession talks since 2005? Indeed, by assuming a key role in Turkish–EU
relations, the Cyprus issue has not only determined, but also been determined by,
those relations before and since 1999. How do the dynamics of domestic politics in
interaction with the EU play a part in changing Turkey’s Cyprus policy? While
looking at Europeanization as a non-linear and context-dependent process in
Turkish–EU relations and examining endogenous sources of change, this article not
only deals with the EU impact on Turkey’s foreign policy per se, but also tackles
the EU’s influence on power distribution in the domestic context and the cost-
benefit calculation of the government in power in deciding a policy change.
Europeanization is concerned with explaining how EU impact occurs. In fact,
establishing causality in Europeanization and the notion of research design have
been successfully studied (e.g. Exadaktylos and Radaelli 2009). Much time has also
been spent on discussing the causal mechanisms of the Europeanization of national
foreign policy to detect the causal significance of the EU (e.g. Moumoutzis 2011),
and to measure outcomes, for example, by presenting process tracing as a method
of inquiry (see Exadaktylos 2012). The Europeanization literature has identified
incompatibility (misfit), EU conditionality and the differential empowerment of
domestic actors as the most important variables to account for domestic change in
member and candidate states (Börzel 1999; Knill and Lehmkuhl 1999; Cowles,
Caporaso, and Risse 2001). Europeanization starts with incompatibility emanating
from EU demands and requirements in the form of conditionality on the one hand
and the domestic situation on the other. During the accession process, Europeaniza-
tion is achieved ‘directly’ through negotiations and the principle of EU conditional-
ity (e.g. see Grabbe 2003, 2006; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2007).
Candidates are required to fulfil the Copenhagen Criteria and to achieve complete
transfer of the acquis communautaire, including the acquis politique of the Com-
mon Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), before membership is finalized. In the































adopted by Turkey towards the Cyprus problem would have been unthinkable with-
out the EU conditionality and membership perspective given to Turkey, cemented
by the European decisions to grant candidacy in 1999 and opening accession talks
in 2005 (Aydın and Açıkmeşe 2007; Terzi 2010).
Europeanization provides a framework that enables one to explain policy
change in a country; it puts forward the EU’s impact per se, and at the same time
highlights the interaction of this impact with domestic factors. Thus, the EU’s
transformative power has its limits; the domestic impact of the EU has been
differential, showing significant variation across policies and institutions (Börzel
2012). Therefore, to account for variation in domestic change, Europeanization
scholarship has increasingly focused on factors mitigating the EU’s transformative
power and the conditions under which domestic change occurs. In the context of
accession, by creating incompatibility between EU requirements and the domestic
situation, EU conditionality disturbs the domestic status quo in the candidate state
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005, 2007). More precisely, in the EU accession
process, conditionality may solve some policy problems in favour of certain domes-
tic actors, generally by increasing their influence in the political system. Thus,
Europeanization also operates ‘indirectly’, through redistributing resources across
domestic actors. Following the rational institutionalist logic, incompatibility may
furnish some domestic actors with opportunities (i.e. political, legal and economic
resources or legitimacy for their ideas) to surpass opponents and comply with EU
criteria (Börzel and Risse 2003, 58; Grabbe 2003). Conversely, adopting EU
requirements may produce ‘welfare or power costs’ (Börzel and Risse 2003) for
actors who would like to rebuff EU conditionality on several grounds to retain their
relative power positions in and influence on the political system. Indeed, since
Turkey’s declared candidacy at the Helsinki European Council in 1999, the
European accession process has apparently disturbed the country’s domestic politi-
cal equilibrium by boosting the power and influence of some domestic actors over
others. In other words, incompatibility between the EU andTurkish positions over
Cyprus took the form of EU conditionality by leading to a realignment within
Turkey of two opposing coalitions (veto players and facilitating actors)1 and their
power struggles. In this study, the veto players include the Turkish Armed Forces
(Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri, TSK); the main opposition party, the Republican People’s
Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) and the other opposition party, the National-
ist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP), who all emerged as passion-
ate advocates of the status quo ante in Turkey’s Cyprus policy. The facilitating
actors, acting as pro-EU reformists and championing a federalist solution in
Cyprus, include the government under the leadership of the Justice and Develop-
ment Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) and, increasingly, NGOs, especially
the most eminent and effective ones in terms of lobbying activities across the
Ankara–Brussels axis, such as the Association of Turkish Industrialists and
Businessmen (Türk Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği, TÜSİAD).
The Europeanization framework also suggests that any policy ‘change’ required
by EU conditionality is ultimately decided and implemented by the government,
which assesses the benefits of complying with EU rules vis-à-vis the domestic costs
for their adoption (see Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). While it was the
AKP government that decided on a policy ‘change’ in Cyprus by actively endors-
ing the UN-sponsored peace plan for the reunification of the island, the capabilities
of domestic actors as veto players and facilitating actors should not be overlooked;






























those actors influenced the government’s decision to facilitate, retard or reject
policy change, particularly once the cabinet became reluctant after 2005 to take rad-
ical steps to transform the Cyprus policy to comply with EU conditionality. This
situation highlights the fact that the pace and extent of Europeanization is not linear
and homogenous but context dependent; therefore, one needs to deconstruct the
interactive pattern between various elements at the domestic and EU levels. Keep-
ing in mind that governments as political actors may act with different motivations
at different periods, this article argues that the cost-benefit calculation by the AKP
government in formulating its Cyprus policy was largely affected by a dynamic
combination of EU-related and domestic factors, such as the prevalent desire in
Turkish society for EU membership and the state establishment, the ability of the
EU to provide a credible membership perspective backed by an even-handed
approach to the Cyprus problem and the strong resistance of anti-reformist domestic
circles in their struggle with pro-EU forces.
This article continues in four parts: the first part lays out a brief overview of
Europeanization as a research agenda and discusses its application to the unique
area of foreign policy with particular reference to the enlargement context. The sec-
ond part briefly explains of the origins and development of the Cyprus case. The
third part explains sources of incompatibility between EU requirements and
Turkey’s responses to the Cyprus dispute; it particularly looks at the positions of
Turkey (before and during the AKP era) and the EU with regard to the Cyprus
problem as well as at how Turkish–EU relations have been affected by the issue.
The fourth part of this study analyses different factors affecting the AKP’s cost-
benefit calculation in implementing the Cyprus policy. In conclusion, dwelling upon
Turkey’s Cyprus policy in the accession process, the article provides a critical anal-
ysis of the EU’s potential for inducing change in the foreign policies of ‘candidate’
nations. It explains how Europeanization has operated in the Cyprus case in differ-
ent periods by concomitantly generating differing levels of impact on policy
change. The EU’s impotence is particularly elaborated on with regard to its credi-
bility of membership perspective, institutional structure and political will (or lack
of it) by paying additional attention to the repercussions of and interaction with
Turkey’s domestic political settings.
The conceptual framework of Europeanization and its application to national
foreign policy
Europeanization is generally referred to when domestic structures, identities, national
policy preferences, interests and national patterns of governance are affected by
pressure from developments at the European level. The most refined and minimalist
definition of the concept might be: domestic political change generated by European
integration (Harmsen and Wilson 2000, 14–8; Risse et al. 2001, 3; Olsen 2002,
923–24; Featherstone 2003; Vink 2003; Bache and Jordan 2006, 20–3). Europeanization
as an analytical framework is generally categorized with regard to the direction and
pattern of domestic change, i.e. how European-level developments feed back into the
domestic level as a result of pressure from the EU. Among several approaches to the
concept, Europeanization refers to a national adaptation of policies, institutions and
policy-making processes for domestic use in response to developments at the EU
level (top-down dimension –EU as a source of change) (Harmsen and Wilson 2000).































exportations of their policy, positions or models to the EU level by getting them
adopted as European common policy (bottom-up dimension – EU as a subject of
change). For example, Germany was able to Europeanize its low deficit and strictly
defined macro-economic policies as convergence criteria in the framework of the
Economic and Monetary Union. Also, the United Kingdom succeeded in
Europeanizing its sanctions on Argentina during the Falkland conflict in 1982 (Wong
2006, 9).
Europeanization helps gauge not only domestic changes themselves, but also
the processes of change. Laying out a framework for the domestic adaptation pro-
cess opens the state’s black box by giving primacy to endogenous factors in terms
of state actors’ capacity to modify or limit European signals, thereby setting the
pace and degree of Europeanization. After all, accepting the pressures from the EU
as a dominant variable may lead to an overestimation of European impact (Wong
2007, 332). As this article shows, apart from EU-level factors such as effective
conditionality and a credible EU accession perspective, domestic sources of change
in the form of capacity, willingness, government political and ideological prefer-
ences, pressure groups, public opinion and political parties as constraining or facili-
tating factors need to be considered. The Europeanization scholarship tends to
conceptualize the process of domestic change through rational choice institutional-
ism and sociological institutionalism,2 which are embedded in neo-institutionalist
theory. While both theories prioritize agency in bringing about domestic change,
they differ in describing how actors define their goals and in what they perceive as
rational behaviour (Börzel 2012, 11). More precisely, and providing a basis for this
article, the former takes up the issue of ‘domestic change’ in the sense of the pol-
icy-makers’ strategic interests and preferences (cost-benefit analysis), as well as a
redistribution of resources (as opportunities and constraints) across domestic actors
by particularly taking into account the existence of veto players (Börzel and Risse
2003). Domestic change is catalysed if veto players are constrained from pursuing
their goals or if the EU furnishes pro-reformist coalitions with additional resources
to exploit the opportunities provided by Europanization (Börzel 2003, 9). The latter
theory, on the contrary, postulates that actors are guided by collective understand-
ings of appropriate and socially accepted behaviour while defining their goals. It
concerns Europeanization as a horizontal process of socialization, persuasion and
collective learning, which focuses on the transformative impact of long-term inter-
action with EU institutions and elites through which actors’ interests, identities, atti-
tudes, perceptions and expectations are altered, and EU norms and interests are
internalized (Knill and Lehmkuhl 1999; Börzel and Risse 2003, 59; Jacquot and
Woll 2003; Bulmer and Radaelli 2004; Terzi 2010; Nas 2012). The extent of inter-
nalization is contingent, on the one hand, on norm entrepreneurs such as epistemic
communities or advocacy networks that persuade actors to redefine their identities
and interests, and on the other hand, a political culture that embraces a consensual
atmosphere conducive to change (Börzel 2012, 12). The debate on accession Euro-
peanization further focuses on the extent and nature of Europeanization, denoting
that while socialization is a slow but steady process, change through the rationalist
mechanisms of differential empowerment via EU conditionality may only give rise
to cosmetic Europeanization, which is reversible, as opposed to entrenched Europe-
anization (Grabbe 2006; Terzi 2010, 2012). In this process, domestic actors may
potentially use EU accession as a ‘legitimization device’ to push and justify their
political agendas (Börzel 2012; Kaliber 2012; Tsarouhas 2012), thereby paving the






























way for contextual Europeanization (Kaliber 2012). Yet, the EU’s differential
impact on candidate states requires further empirical research because domestic
actors/factors’ roles are still regarded as underspecified and ambiguous in the litera-
ture (see Börzel 2012, 12).
The EU impact on change in foreign policy is invisible, minimal, and thus diffi-
cult to detect, compared to the first pillar.3 Notwithstanding the methodological
problems of the application of the conceptual framework of Europeanization to for-
eign policy and the unique characteristics of this policy area at the national and EU
levels,4 there exist some changes documented in the study of Europeanization as a
result of interaction between national and European levels.
Overviews of studies on foreign policy Europeanization in member states reveal
that Europeanization occurs predominantly through voluntary policy convergence
(top-down), bottom-up projection of national policy and socialization (Glarbo 2001;
Tonra 2001; Aggestam 1999), rather than through forced adaptation to European
requirements, which is frequently seen in first-pillar policy areas. This phenomenon
occurs because it is believed that repeated interactions with the EU and enduring
participation in CFSP mechanisms pave the way for a reorientation of foreign pol-
icy cultures (Smith 2000, 2004) as well as for the emergence of a ‘coordination
reflex’ (Tonra 2003) among bureaucrats and decision-makers. Unlike the obligatory
implementation of Community Law in the first pillar, in the absence of a suprana-
tional and authoritative actor in the CFSP, the EU can hardly enforce changes in
the foreign policies of its members. Thus, the dominant pattern of Europeanization
becomes ‘horizontal’, via learning, emulating and socialization. ‘Bottom-up’ Euro-
peanization, via uploading of specific interests, policies and preferences to the EU
level, also occurs. Examining the French, German and British cases suggests that
policy projection capabilities and the intentions of those major powers have been
influential in the pace and nature of political integration and in the formation of the
CFSP and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) (Gross 2009). To further
exemplify this, the bottom-up mode can be seen in the cases of France projecting
the creation of the Political Union; Britain exporting the pillar structure of the
CFSP, the EU’s Strategy Document; Greece uploading its Cyprus policy and its
approach to Turkish–Greek relations; Germany uploading its creation of the Politi-
cal Union and Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe and Spain projecting its
Latin American and Mediterranean policy. Policy changes in member states are pre-
dominantly nationally directed and in the form of voluntary adaptation instead of
coercive convergence, and are by and large orchestrated by national capitals so as
to better conform to European measures.5
In addition to exerting pressure on current members, the EU also exerts pres-
sures on candidate states. As opposed to member states, however, potential entrants
are exposed to more hierarchical and coercive form of Europeanization through EU
conditionality in almost every area, including foreign policy. During the formal
accession process, each candidate state must adopt the acquis politique of the CFSP
until accession. An ‘unequal’ relationship with the EU, consisting of accession
negotiations and the principle of conditionality, furnishes it with more coercive
ways to influence candidate states’ domestic policies. Because acceding states are
not equipped with enough powers, such as the veto card, to influence the EU’s
decision-making system from the inside, they must comply with EU conditionality
to become a member. Unlike member states, they have no room to negotiate dero-































European Commission regarding adoption and implementation of EU policies
multiplies the coerciveness of the accession process for candidates. This observa-
tion allows one to detect the magnitude and extension of the EU impact on
Turkey’s Cyprus policy since 1999.
Europeanization is defined in this study as the process of change at the
domestic (policy) level originating from adaptational pressures coming directly
or indirectly from the EU, a process whose nature and extent is determined by
a complex combination of factors, such as the level of incompatibility; credibil-
ity of conditionality and membership perspective; endogenous factors and the
relative position of a state vis-à-vis the EU, i.e. whether it is a member or
candidate.
Indeed, there is a widespread assumption that the EU policy of conditionality,
declared the at Copenhagen European Council in 1993, has become the basis for fos-
tering change in candidate states (Grabbe 2001, 2002, 2003, 2006; Schimmelfennig
et al. 2003; Hughes et al. 2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004, 2005, 2007).
The effectiveness of conditionality is mostly determined by the presence or absence
of a credible membership perspective, preferences of the government in terms of the
domestic political cost of change and preferences of the veto players (Schimmelfen-
nig and Sedelmeier 2004). In fact, the close linkage between effective conditionality
and maintaining a credible membership perspective was reflected in the 2005 Strat-
egy Paper of the Commission. The paper emphasized that
the effectiveness of conditionality (…) depends on maintaining a credible political
perspective for eventual integration into the Union. Aspirant countries can best sustain
public support (…) when the EU supports them (…) and keeps its own promises.
(European Commission, Brussels, 9 November 2005)
In the context of enlargement, conditionality in the area of foreign policy is formal-
ized through the third aspect of the Copenhagen Criteria: embracing the capacity to
take on the obligations of membership as well as the adoption and implementation
of the (CFSP) acquis. Acceding countries are expected to participate in the political
dialogue to regularly align their positions with those of the other members of the
Union, including around sanctions and restrictive measures, statements, declarations
and démarches, where required. As far as settlement of the Cyprus dispute is con-
cerned, EU conditionality (in foreign policy) can be considered part of the CFSP
acquis (the third Copenhagen criterion), relating to the Union’s common positions,
declarations and statements on the Cyprus issue or, alternatively, as part of
‘enhanced political dialogue and political criteria’. The EU tends to handle the
Cyprus problem as part of the latter,6 namely, enhanced political dialogue and polit-
ical criteria, ‘sufficient’ fulfilment of which is regarded sine qua non for any candi-
date to embark upon accession talks, and non-compliance of which may result in
suspension of talks. Although not formally uttered as part of the Copenhagen politi-
cal criteria or as a precondition for membership by either Brussels or Ankara, the
Cyprus issue has become a ‘non-Copenhagen benchmark’ at the rhetorical and
political level that has been determining the pace and extent of Turkish–EU rela-
tions, particularly after Helsinki. Moreover, since 2006, the EU has treated the dis-
pute not merely as a bilateral problem, dealing a blow to Turkish–EU relations in
the political domain, but also as a legal and contractual issue, which further reduces
room for bargaining and negotiation.7






























Practically, the legal and political basis for EU conditionality vis-à-vis Turkey is
predominantly embodied by the Ankara Agreement (Association Agreement) and
its Additional Protocol, Accession Partnership(s), Negotiating Framework
Document, Enlargement Strategy Paper(s) and European Council Presidency Con-
clusions, as well as by Regular Reports. As will be detailed in the following parts,
the Cyprus problem appears to be the main roadblock in Turkey’s otherwise
smooth progress in accession negotiations.
The Cyprus debacle: its genesis and evolution
The island of Cyprus was part of the Ottoman Empire from 1571 until 1878, when
it came under British colonial rule that lasted until 1960, when it became an inde-
pendent republic. The Republic of Cyprus was a functional federation based on
political equality of its two main communities, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypri-
ots, and their obligation to share sovereignty with their respective powers of self-
government. Geographical separation was avoided through a guaranteed system of
bi-communal partnership. Three years later, the constitutional order threatened to
deteriorate when President Makarios proposed to amend the constitution. The pro-
posed changes were unacceptable to Turkish Cypriots and Turkey alike because the
former would be relegated to minority status. The tension between the two commu-
nities led to anti-Turkish violence and civil disorder between 1964 and 1974. Since
1964, however, the Greek Cypriot side of Cyprus has enjoyed legitimacy via recog-
nition of its government as the ‘Government of Cyprus’ by UN Security Council
Resolution (186 S/5575). The issue rekindled in 1974 once the military junta in
Athens attempted to overthrow Makarios and install a pro-enosis Nicos Sampson as
president. Relying on Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee (to protect the island’s
independence and restore constitutional order), Turkey landed troops in Cyprus and
occupied the northern part in 1974, which resulted in the island’s de facto partition.
The UN has been exercising a good offices mission between the two communi-
ties on the island since 1968. Accordingly, a solution must be based on a State of
Cyprus having a single sovereignty, an international personality and a single citi-
zenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded, and comprising
two politically equal communities in a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation that
must exclude union in whole or in part with any other country or any form of parti-
tion or secession.8
Even if parties more or less accepted the UN-sponsored formula of bi-commu-
nal and bi-zonal federation, differences would still exist as to what this formula in
fact would imply for each party (Axt 1999, 190–91). For the Greek Cypriots, a fed-
erative solution would mean swinging back to the pre-1974 status quo9: a federa-
tion with a strong central government; single sovereignty, personality and
citizenship for all Cypriots; free movement of persons; unrestricted purchase of
property; restitution of lost property in the North instead of global exchange or
compensation; some territorial readjustments; removal of Turkish troops; removal
of Turkish settlers and continuation of the ‘Republic of Cyprus’ by federalizing it
via a constitutional exercise.
On the contrary, for Turkish Cypriots, a federal solution would embrace recog-
nition of the equality of two separate peoples with differing cultures, religions and
languages; continuance of the Treaty of Guarantee, emphasizing guarantees by































federal governments; readjustment of Turkish territory, excluding Güzelyurt
(Morphou) and Gazi Mağusa (Famagusta); compensation, global exchange and
‘limited’ return instead of property restitution; creation of a ‘new’ partnership state;
and emphasis on strong bi-zonality.
The parties cannot even agree on when and how the conflict was triggered.10
For instance, the Greek Cypriots treat the Cyprus question as a ‘problem of inva-
sion’ (of Turkish troops) that started in 1974, whereas for Turkish Cypriots, the
genesis goes back to 1963, when they were ousted from power by their Greek
compatriots, thus ending the partnership state of the former ‘Republic of Cyprus’.
As to what the constitutional style of the Republic implicated, Greek Cypriots per-
ceived that it was nothing but a ‘unitary state’; for the Turkish Cypriots, it was a
‘partnership state’ based on functional federation. For Turkey and the Turkish Cyp-
riots, the state of affairs that had been established through the 1959 and 1960
Agreements in Cyprus had been damaged: the internal balance was upset by the
Greek Cypriots’ move to end the 1960 partnership in 1963. Further, the external
balance was altered with the UN’s decision in 1964 legitimizing the ‘Government
of Cyprus’, which was at the time composed only of Greek Cypriots via Greek
Cypriots’. It further deteriorated when, Greek Cypriots gained EU membership
under the banner of the ‘Republic of Cyprus’ on May 2004 without settling the
issue and before Turkey has become a member. In 1983, in an attempt to recover
the internal balance and assert equal partnership vis-à-vis the Greek Cypriots, the
Turkish Cypriot side, by claiming the right of self-determination, declared indepen-
dence under the name of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), but
this entity is not recognized by any member of international community other than
Turkey. Concerning the external balance, Turkey has reacted with a ‘persistent
objection’ to what it regards as the ‘illegal’ unilateral application of Greek Cypriots
for entry into the EU and the EU acceptance of that membership.11
Sources of incompatibility between the EU’s requirements and Turkey’s
Cyprus policy
The level of mismatch between EU requirements and a country’s existing policies
lies among factors determining the nature and extent of Europeanization. Thus, pin-
pointing the EU’s impact on Turkey’s Cyprus policy necessitates us to underline
sources of incongruence between the requirements of Brussels of Ankara on the
one hand, and Ankara’s position on the other. Understanding the nucleus of incom-
patibility is also of significance because the Cyprus impasse has always played a
pivotal role across the Brussels–Ankara axis and presently lies at the heart of the
current pause in Turkish–EU relations. In the post-Helsinki period, adaptation pres-
sures – in the form of conditionality and a linkage policy – led to incompatibility
between the Turkish and EU positions, the roots of which constitute the basis of
the next section of this article.
The EU’s position: from self-declared ‘impartiality’ to active engagement
The EU and its predecessor, the European Community, have displayed considerable
interest in the Cyprus dispute (e.g. see Brewin 1999, 2000; Müftüler-Baç and
Güney 2005). Actually, the EU’s indirect involvement in the conflict began in the
1960s, when Greece (1962) and Turkey (1963) concluded association agreements;






























the association status granted by the Community to Cyprus12 in 1972; Britain
gained membership in 1973 by virtue of its colonial past and military bases on the
island; and Greece gained membership in 1981 through its historical, cultural and
ethnic links with the island as well as its political strategy of ‘enosis’. Because UN
recognition is regarded as a standard for other international actors, the EU followed
suit. The EU and its member states regard the UN as an appropriate framework for
resolution of the Cyprus dispute and strongly endorse UN parameters13 for
solution.
In fact, the Union had previously adopted a ‘policy of even-handedness’14
towards its associate members of Turkey and Greece and asserted ‘the rule of non-
discrimination’15 in the Association Agreement signed with Cyprus in 1972. That
policy, however, could only be sustained until Greece became a member in 1981.
Since then, Greece has strived to upload its twin-pillar political strategy towards
Turkey, involving first, the accession of Cyprus to the EU, and second, linking a
rapprochement between Ankara and Brussels with progress on the Cyprus problem
(Stivachtis 2002, 50). Greece’s strategy was adopted at the Community level in
April 1988, when the European Council stated that ‘the Cyprus problem affects
EC–Turkey relations’; this was later reiterated in the Dublin European Council
decisions on 25–26 June 1990.
Indeed, the Greek Cypriot application to the Community and its eventual acces-
sion process leading to membership in 2004 helped deaden the issue for the EU
and partly resulted in the current impasse in Turkish–EU relations. In the begin-
ning, the widespread view in the then-EC underlined that Cyprus membership was
not possible without prior political settlement. Nonetheless, beginning at the Corfu
and Essen Summits of 1994, and the 6 March 1995 decision of the EU General
Affairs Council, the EU has considerably revised its position, arguing that Cyprus
can become a member even without prior settlement of the issue, though it was still
thought that Cyprus’ accession to the EU would act as catalyst for a negotiated
solution.
Particularly since the 1990s, Turkish–EU relations have not been able to evolve
independently of the problems between Turkey and Greece, including the Cyprus
issue. While granting Turkey candidacy status, the Helsinki European Council
reported that resolution of the Cyprus debacle was not a precondition for accession
of Cyprus to the EU, yet it explicitly linked Turkey’s pre-accession process to set-
tlement of its problems with Greece and Cyprus. This condition was also included
in the 2001 Accession Partnership Document for Turkey as one of the short-term
priorities. The EU assumed that given the strong possibility of a veto by the Greeks
and Greek Cypriots to block Turkey’s eventual accession to the EU, Turkey was
expected to adopt a more active and conciliatory approach in the dispute before
Cyprus’ entry (Tocci 2002, 107–9).
Accession talks with Turkey were finally launched on 3 October 2005. One of
the conditions articulated for Ankara was to extend the Ankara Agreement of 1963
with the European Economic Community (EEC), to the Union’s ten new members,
including Cyprus, which is not recognized by Turkey. Further, under the Negotiat-
ing Framework document prepared for Turkey, which sets out the principles
governing accession negotiations, Ankara’s progress in accession talks will be mea-
sured, inter alia, by its ‘continued support for efforts to achieve a comprehensive
settlement of the Cyprus problem within the UN framework and (…) to contribute































Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus.’ On 29 July 2005, the Turkish
government signed the Additional Protocol, but issued a declaration16 saying that
its signature did not denote recognition of Cyprus. Ankara ultimately declined to
implement the Protocol by refusing to open its harbours and airports to Cyprus-
flagged vessels and aircrafts. In the wake of Turkey’s move, the EU adopted a
counter-declaration on 21 September 2005 to make it clear that the ‘(…) opening
of negotiations on the relevant chapters depends on Turkey’s implementation of its
contractual obligations to all Member States’, and underlined the importance of
Turkey recognizing all Member States and normalizing relations with them as an
indispensable component of the accession process (Council of the EU, Brussels, 21
September 2005). Upon the Commission’s recommendation for the partial suspen-
sion of talks on the grounds that Turkey had failed to comply with the Protocol
and thus prevented the free movement of goods, on 11 December 2006, EU foreign
ministers decided to suspend talks with Turkey on eight relevant chapters17 by
declaring that ‘no chapter will be provisionally closed until Turkey has fulfilled its
commitment’. Moreover, five other chapters have been blocked by France and six
chapters have been blocked by Cyprus for political reasons – mostly because of the
Cyprus problem. Hence, not only the settlement of the Cyprus dispute but also the
recognition of it has become a condition for Turkey’s bid for EU membership,
thereby setting the stage for ongoing incompatibility between Brussels and Ankara.
Contrary to what the EU expected, allowing Cypriot accession to the EU by
dropping conditionality for Greek Cypriots during 1994–1995 decreased Turkish
(including Turkish Cypriot) incentive for conciliation, at least until 2002. Indeed,
the membership perspective given to Greek Cypriots under the name of the
‘Republic of Cyprus’ and the concomitant evolution of Turkey–EU relations have
direct implications on Turkish policy regarding the Cyprus debacle.
Turkey’s position: before the AKP era
The Cyprus impasse has always occupied a central place within Turkish foreign
policy, with implications for regional and global security starting from the early
1960s, but especially since the 1974 Turkish military intervention on the island.
The Cyprus question is such a controversial issue that no government in Turkey,
even if it desired, can go beyond the ‘national settlement package’ that has emerged
so far, and which is so powerful in shaping Turkish public opinion.18
As a matter of fact, Turkey’s official position regarding its parameters for a
comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem has evolved over the years, begin-
ning with (between 1964 and 1974) endorsing an equal say for the Turkish Cypriot
community in the central administration and special (security) guarantees, to
(between 1974 and 1998) favouring federalism (based on geography), especially
after Bülent Ecevit came to power as Turkish Prime Minister, to (between 1998
and 2003) confederation and demand for prior recognition of the TRNC to (since
2003) buttressing the Annan Plan’s federative solution. During those periods, while
pledging support to inter-communal talks under the good offices mission of the
UN, Ankara consistently asked that Turkish Cypriots’ security needs be met, for
preservation of an internal balance between the two communities and an external
balance between Turkey and Greece, and for equal participation of the Turkish
Cypriot community in the central government.






























For Turkey, Greek Cypriot EU membership as ‘a second Greek state’ implies
‘an indirect integration with Greece’, which is in contravention of international trea-
ties.19 Turkey considered Cyprus’ application for membership illegitimate because
there has not been a joint government representative of the entire island since
1963. Ankara further maintains that only after the two communities agreed on the
sovereign equality of the sides and reached a political settlement should the issue
of EU membership have been considered, and that a federal Cyprus should have
joined the EU only simultaneously with Turkey’s accession.
As opposed to what the EU had hoped for, the smooth accession of Cyprus to
the EU without precondition for political settlement was made possible at the
expense of: first, unstable relations between Brussels and Ankara; second, harden-
ing of the latter’s position on a comprehensive political solution to the Cyprus dis-
pute (at least until 2002); and third, the establishment of even closer relations
between Turkey and the TRNC. For Turkey, concomitant with the EU’s decision to
launch accession talks with Cyprus in March 1998, the framework for a federal set-
tlement and the relevant parameters that had accumulated to that point became
invalid and inapplicable. Turkey then formulated a Cyprus Confederation thesis,
referring to the pre-acceptance by Greek Cypriots of the recognition of the political
equality and sovereignty of the TRNC as a basis for resuming any inter-communal
negotiations on the island.
Although institutional, legal and policy Europeanization started with Turkey’s
candidacy in 1999, the EU accession perspective could not generate a change in
Cyprus policy at the governmental level until 2002. Between May 1999 and
November 2002, the coalition government of the DSP (Democratic Left Party), the
MHP and the ANAP (Motherland Party) led by veteran Bülent Ecevit was in power
in Turkey. Despite the mounting EU pressure in 2001 and 2002, intra-coalition
dynamics did not allow the expected policy change in Cyprus. Apart from high
public support concerning Turkey’s EU perspective, domestically empowered lib-
eral reform coalitions, eager to question traditional foreign policy over Cyprus, gen-
erally embraced the relatively weak and liberal coalition partner ANAP and
business circles. Yet, domestic pro-reformists could not override the conservative
impact of the DSP and the nationalist-statist MHP nor the political preferences of
the state establishment (Narbonne and Tocci 2009; Ulusoy and Verney 2009; Terzi
2010). The lack of political will and capacity on the part of government to change
the status-quo in its Cyprus policy was due largely to a perception of Greece encir-
cling Turkey, the linkage policy of the EU, ambivalent jargon adopted at Helsinki,
EU membership of Cyprus before Turkey, and uncertainties on the way to Turkish
membership. The pace of Europeanization was stepped up with the AKP’s coming
to power in November 2002, yet visibly slowed after a date for accession talks was
established in 2005. The change in Ankara’s Cyprus policy – a shift from the con-
federation proposal made in 1998 to striving for a federalist solution as indicated
by the UN-sponsored Annan Plan in 2004 – was facilitated by the AKP govern-
ment, which adopted a conciliatory rhetoric and a win-win policy in Cyprus.
The Cyprus issue during the AKP era: what difference?
While explaining how the EU has affected Turkey’s policy change in Cyprus, the
conceptual framework of Europeanization tells us that whether incompatibility leads































national adaptation and change. A credible prospect of Turkish membership after
1999 contributed to the process of emergence and consolidation of a collective of
formal facilitating actors in the Turkish political landscape, who ardently advocated
EU membership and made a powerful commitment to undertake the related
reforms. As Kaliber (2005, 334) succinctly put it, the boundaries between ‘foreign
policy devoid of public discussion and political input’ on the one hand, and ‘politi-
cians representing political will’ on the other, began to disappear in the wake of
Helsinki. The traditional Cyprus policy pursued by pro-status quo, pro-establish-
ment and nationalist veto players has begun to be challenged by a combination of
‘the executive and civil society’. The influential ingredients of such a coalition are
comprised of the majority government formed by the AKP, as well as NGOs (par-
ticularly those embracing representatives of big business, such as TÜSİAD), that
are increasingly manifesting themselves in the political arena by advocating democ-
ratization in the Turkish context.
Following Turkey’s November 2002 parliamentary elections, the AKP govern-
ment established itself as an enthusiastic player determined to facilitate the
fulfilment of the accession criteria; therefore, settling the Cyprus problem would
provide relief across the Ankara–Brussels axis.20 The idea of pledging support for
federation in Cyprus as foreseen in the Annan Plan21 was considered by Turkish
decision-making elites as the most comprehensive peace plan ever, and it was
brought to the newly elected government at the appropriate time.22 As part of a tac-
tical move, it was thought that the Plan should have been given a chance to be
negotiated because it had enjoyed the widespread support of major powers and the
international community as a whole. Accordingly, Turkish policy was based upon
the strong supposition that because Greek Cypriots would likely reject the Plan,
Turkey would capitalize on an affirmative approach either way.
Indeed, with the newly elected government, some aspects of Turkey’s Cyprus
policy were redesigned. First, unlike the former policy stance of denying linkage,
the AKP grasped the linkage between Turkey’s bid for EU membership and settle-
ment in Cyprus23 because its leadership believed in the necessity of changing the
status-quo, and felt that non-settlement in Cyprus was not a solution. The AKP’s
election manifesto explicitly referred to the Belgian model based on a federation
composed of two communities (rather than states). While endorsing the Annan
Plan’s vision of a single state with two self-governing zones, the government chal-
lenged the status-quo on the island since the 1974 military intervention. The second
aspect of the new policy was to reverse the long-standing perception that Turks had
been the reluctant and obstructionist party throughout the peace talks. The AKP
government wanted to send a message that the Turkish side would always keep
pyschological superiority by being receptive to new peace proposals and throwing
the ball into the court of the Greek Cypriots (Robins 2007, 297). Notwithstanding
its visible gravitation towards a federalist solution offered by the Annan Plan, con-
stant themes in Turkey’s official Cyprus policy has been the persistent objection to
Cypriot EU membership and an emphasis on the rights of Turkey, emanating from
the London–Zurich Accords.
Following the above discussion, given Turkey’s membership aspirations, the
change in Turkey’s Cyprus policy between the years 2002 and 2005 can be over-
whelmingly attributed to the EU’s adaptational pressures, such as the inevitable fact
of Cypriot membership before Turkey and without precondition of settlement (indi-
rectly), and the conditionality and linkage policy of the EU as evidenced by the






























Helsinki conclusions (directly). Further pressure came from TÜSİAD between 2001
and 2002, which conducted Brussels-based lobbying activities, embarked upon an
extensive media campaign, and made frequent public statements, trying to build
mass support for EU membership and exert mounting pressure on the government
to revise the official policy stance in Cyprus and endorse the Annan Plan.
Ankara had always officially backed Northern Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş,
who was usually regarded as a nationalist hardliner. Yet, there had been a growing
tension between Denktaş and the AKP government as the latter adopted a construc-
tive stance towards the Annan Plan. Denktaş’ hesitancy to seriously negotiate the
Plan was facing strong societal and political pressures from within the TRNC as
well. Against the eventual reconfiguration of political forces in Northern Cyprus,
pro-EU actors in favour of reunification, led by leftist-unionist Mehmet Ali Talat,
gained the upper hand, gradually removing the nationalists from power in parlia-
mentary elections in December 2003 and then in presidential elections in April
2005.
Given the looming deadline of Cyprus’ accession, Turkish and Greek Cypriots
resumed negotiations at the end of 2001. In December 2002, the Copenhagen Euro-
pean Council declared that accession talks with Cyprus had been concluded and
that the country would become an EU member. It also stated that ‘if the December
2004 European Council [in Brussels] decides that Turkey has fulfilled the Copenha-
gen political criteria, the negotiations will be opened without delay’. The inter-
communal talks on the island based upon the Annan Plan could not secure a deal
in 2002 due to the strong reservations of the Turkish military and Denktaş concern-
ing security, bizonality, sovereignty and equality (Ulusoy 2008). Yet, both before
and after the Copenhagen summit, societal dissent in the form of public demonstra-
tions and business and media pressures in Turkey and the TRNC, indicated an
explicit preference for reunification of the island before its EU membership, thereby
pushing the Turkish side to negotiate the Annan Plan (Ulusoy 2008). This time,
endorsed by a significant part of civilian and military bureaucracy, the AKP gov-
ernment decided to return the negotiation table. Following inter-communal talks
during February and March 2004, the Annan Plan was brought to referendums in
both parties on 24 April in an attempt to reunify the island before its membership.
Unfortunately, the attempt failed due to its overwhelming rejection (75.83%) by the
Greek Cypriot people. This result was in stark contrast to the strong affirmative
vote of the Turkish Cypriots (64.91%). Behind the Greek Cypriots’ rejectionist
stance lay an already guaranteed EU membership on 1 May 2004, and the likeli-
hood of negotiating better terms for Cyprus in the future, and a veto power to defer
Turkey’s membership. Indeed, the rejection of the plan was explicitly called for by
the other side’s nationalist hardliner leader Tassos Papadopoulos, in a televised
address on 7 April 2004, where he asked for a resounding no to the Annan Plan
from the Greek Cypriot people. In December 2004, the Brussels European Council
decided that Turkey ‘sufficiently’ fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria, and
thus it would open accession negotiations on 3 October 2005. The Turkish govern-
ment was also called upon to extend the Ankara Agreement to the EU’s ten new
members including Cyprus. While the Union’s decision to launch accession talks
with Turkey enforced the latter to sign the Additional Protocol on 29 October
2005, Ankara simultaneously fell short of expectations with neither its implementa-
tion nor its recognition of Cyprus. The Erdoğan government justifies its refusal to































up to its promises24 concerning direct trade and easing of the isolation of the
Turkish Cypriots on cultural and athletic affairs so far. In order to overcome the
difficulties deriving from the bottleneck in Cyprus and to reflect its dedication to
comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus impasse, Turkey came forward with two
initiatives in 2005 and 2006, which called upon all relevant parties to simulta-
neously eradicate all restrictions imposed on both sides around freedom of goods,
persons and services. The accelerated pace of Europeanization continued until
2005; however, given the mismatch between the implementation of the Protocol
and the recognition of Cyprus, as well as the EU’s failure to give Turkey a credible
membership perspective and fulfil its promises of easing the isolation of Turkish
Cypriots, it registered an apparent deceleration following the opening of accession
talks in 2005 (Robins 2003, 2007; Patton 2007, 344). Also, the EU’s decision on
December 2006 to partially suspend talks with Turkey on eight chapters appeared
to underline once again the linkage between Turkey’s accession and concessions on
Cyprus, thus the EU’s unwillingness to maintain its commitment to Turkey’s mem-
bership (Ulusoy and Verney 2009, 122). Against a nationalist backlash at home, the
EU’s move contributed to the government’s reluctance to take further action in
favour of a solution. Subsequent to a visible inertia between 2005 and 2008 in
Turkish–EU relations, the government decided to complete preparations for the
remaining chapters regardless of whether they were blocked until 2013 so that until
the Cyprus deadlock is overcome, Turkey could gain time and the EU would be
deprived of any pretext to slow Turkish–EU relations again. The AKP’s ‘rediscov-
ery’ of the EU anchor for democratization at home in 2008 coincided with the law-
suit filed for its closure by the Constitutional Court. After the failure of the Annan
Plan, inter-communal negotiations were given a fresh boost by the UN Deputy Sec-
retary General for Political Affairs Ibrahim Ghambari in 2006. Yet, it was not until
PM Erdoğan sent a letter in 2008 that the process was rejuvenated, leading to nego-
tiations between Talat and pro-solution Greek Cypriot leader Christofias on 3 Sep-
tember 2008. The basic principles that would guide the negotiations had already
been declared by those leaders at a meeting on 23 May: bi-communal and bi-zonal
federation with a single international personality, single sovereignty and single citi-
zenship composed of the politically equal founding states of Turkish and Greek
Cypriots. The negotiations regarding the 2008 peace process has been particularly
built on six major issues: government, EU affairs, security and guarantees, land,
property and economy. As an extension to its policy of being one step ahaid, Tur-
key’s motivation for this initiative was to work out the protocol crises and to detach
the Cyprus imbroglio from Turkish–EU relations. The EU’s decision to incorporate
Cyprus as a divided island and its disregard of Turkish Cypriots’ support for the
Annan Plan by failing to deliver on its promises of termination of their isolation
created disappointment in the North, where hardline nationalists led by Derviş
Eroğlu eventually displaced Talat in parliamentary elections in April 2009 and then
in presidential elections in 2010. Yet, the fact that Eroğlu’s leadership did not lead
to the collapse of talks shows the continuing commitment of Turkish governing
elites to reunification on the basis of the UN body of work. Similar to the
2001–2004 period leading to the Annan Plan’s referenda, Greek Cypriots are enjoy-
ing the legitimacy, the benefits of the title of Republic of Cyprus representing the
whole island, and more recently the EU membership leverage, and seem to be
unwilling to cede their superiority at the negotiation table.






























In the Turkish general elections held on 12 June 2011, PM Erdoğan won a
victory for the third time, raising party votes to 49.9%.25 The third AKP govern-
ment chose to visibly adopt a hardline rhetoric not only in domestic politics (i.e.
the Kurdish issue) but also in foreign affairs, including Israel, Syria, Armenia, the
EU and the Cyprus issues. As the Erdoğan government consolidated its political
power, which has been attended by sound economic performance, a more self-con-
fident tone is increasingly noted in its handling of the Cyprus issue and the pattern
of Turkish–EU relations. For example, on his visit to Northern Cyprus on 20 July
2011 after the elections, Erdoğan warned that if Cyprus assumed presidency of the
EU on July 2012 and negotiations on the island were not finalized by then, Turkey
would suspend its relations with the EU.26 In a similar vein, Turkish President
Abdullah Gül said on an official visit to London on November 2011 that when
Cyprus takes over rotating presidency of the EU on July 2012, it would be a ‘half-
country leading a miserable union’ and added that unless the EU persuaded the
Greek Cypriots to reach a compromise by July 2012, there would be no reason for
the Greek Cypriots to reconcile, and Turkey might consider a two-state solution.27
As has been frequently pointed out by Turkish leaders in recent years, inter-
communal negotiations cannot continue indefinitely; for the Turkish side, putting a
final date for settlement is necessary to compel the Greek Cypriot side to compro-
mise. Likewise, Eroğlu acknowledged that negotiations would not continue after 1
July 2012, and that the only chance for settlement would be to convene an interna-
tional conference; otherwise parameters for solution would have to be revised.28
Given the split in the UN Security Council and Greek Cypriot objections to the
idea of arbitration, scheduling and international conference, a more likely option
would be to devise a new peace plan. A Ban Ki Moon Plan29 is expected to be
agreed upon in early 2014 and put to referenda after March 2014.30 In case this
attempt fails to conclude a peace agreement, too, the UN would most probably be
announcing the international community the termination of its good offices mission
that has been lasting since 1968, in the absence of a will in favour of reunification.
In fact, this would legitimize a search for alternative parameters of solution other
than reunification, including peaceful coexistence of two states as a last resort.
Concomitantly, as far as the rising strategic importance of Cyprus’ location in
the context of Baku-Tsiblis-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the East–West energy corridor, and
its proximity to the geography of the ‘Arab Spring’, a Turkish presence in Cyprus
is occupying a more noteworthy place in regional leadership calculations and the
Turkish government’s multidimensional foreign policy (see also Kaliber 2012). For
example, in September 2011, the Greek Cypriots initiated exploratory drilling for
natural gas and oil in the Mediterranean with the partnership of an American-Israeli
firm. Turkey reacted by signing the Continental Shelf Limitation Agreement with
Turkish Cypriots and sent the Turkish vessel Piri Reis to carry out research in the
region. In fact, in the light of its ascending regional role and activism in recent
years, Turkey is highly likely to aim to prevent any unilateral advantage by Greek
Cypriots in the Eastern Mediterranean without the Cyprus issue being resolved.
Interestingly, as hopes for a settlement erode and the government’s patience for
determining a final date for solution, its post-election discourse on the Cyprus
debacle has become considerably closer to the hawkish, pro-status quo, security-
first policy based on the two-state solution proposed by the former Northern
































At the end of the day, policy change required by EU conditionality is ultimately
decided and implemented by a country’s government, which evaluates the benefits
of complying with EU rules vis-à-vis the domestic costs of their adoption by taking
into account domestic and EU-related pressures and the maximization of its politi-
cal advantages (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). How this calculation relates
to Turkey constitutes the next section.
The AKP government’s cost-benefit calculation
The structure of the accession process, strictly underpinned by demands through
negotiations, requires involvement of national executives who are considered to
have a ‘privilege over legislature and judiciary in terms of political attention and
commitment of resources, both human and financial’ (Grabbe 2001, 1016). The
Turkish political system does not constitute an exception in that regard; the execu-
tive branch – especially when holding the majority in the parliament – is afforded
considerable power and influence in the decision-making process, including in mat-
ters of foreign policy.
This article suggests that in deciding to change Turkey’s stance on its Cyprus
policy, the AKP’s cost-benefit analysis appeared to be affected by four related sets
of factors: first, support pledged by Turkish society to the EU accession process;
second, EU membership as a state policy for almost fifty years; third, EU-related
factors, such as the presence and/or absence of a credible EU membership perspec-
tive and the asymmetrical relationship with the EU during the pre-accession period,
bolstered by both the conditionality and the linkage policy of the EU; and fourth,
the effects of veto players.
The first factor relates to domestic public opinion with regards to the EU and
its support of membership, mostly due to expected material benefits and a better
standard of living.32 This support is accompanied by – somewhat ironically – fears,
scepticism and mistrust of the Union. In fact, fluctuations in public support of
Brussels stem from various factors, including unfavourable statements by politicians
in member states regarding Turkey’s European credentials and eventual member-
ship; perceived double standards for Turkey regarding the Cyprus issue and EU’s
linkage policy, especially in the face of the principles laid down in the Negotiating
Framework document and other declarations and reports; and the non-reciprocal
demands of the EU. The level of support is also related to the historical factor of
the ‘Sevres trauma’, denoting the emergence of the modern Turkish Republic fol-
lowing the anti-imperialist war waged against European powers. Together, these
factors incite scepticism towards the so-called ‘Western powers’. According to
Eurobarometer polls, the percentage of Turkish people who think that ‘membership
to the EU is a good thing’ has varied between 55% in the autumn of 2005 and
42% in the spring of 2008, with a rise to 48% in the spring of 2009 and drop to
42% in the autumn of 2010. As long as support to the EU accession process in
Turkey is identified with economic welfare, one may expect further erosion to the
enthusiasm for membership to the Union given the recent economic and political
turmoil in the Eurozone.
Such public anxiety may occasionally give rise to nationalism, which is partly
boosted by the perceived psyche of being discriminated against by the EU.
According to a 2008 public opinion research poll on nationalism in Turkey,33
50.1% of people think that nationalism has risen recently in Turkey (although






























30.4% rejected this argument). The reasons for this observed increase in
nationalism include ‘the EU’s ostracizing and annoying attitude towards Turkey’
(33.8%); ‘Turkey’s inadequacy in foreign policy, Iraq and Cyprus (23.6%), and
‘some groups in Turkey made their claims by relying on the US and the EU’
(16.1%).
Given the general support of Turkish society towards the idea of EU member-
ship, however, steps aiming at bringing Turkey closer to the EU at home would
raise the AKP’s share of the votes, boost its domestic legitimacy as a pro-EU, lib-
eral and democratic mass party, and consolidate Turkish democracy in the case of a
settlement in Cyprus. Similarly, in the face of a good deal of sympathy and solidar-
ity registered by the Turkish people towards Turkish Cypriots, termination of their
isolation and embargo in the event of a solution, would no doubt lead to the devel-
opment of the northern part of the island, which would in turn increase the domes-
tic endorsement the AKP enjoys.
Conversely, public opinion in the sense of rising nationalism (partly as a result
of the EU’s perceived discriminatory policy), also acts as an important factor in the
AKP government’s care to not alienate its electoral constituency, especially since
2005, in the face of opposition by veto players. The AKP government took a politi-
cal risk by buttressing the Annan Plan, because the Cyprus issue, for the most part,
acts like a barometer in terms of directing incitement of nationalistic impulses and
fluctuations in Turkish societal support for EU membership. Although the AKP
emerged stronger after the June 2011 general elections, it is well aware of the need
to sustain as much public support as possible (including from the nationalists), for
the upcoming new constitution and Erdoğan’s probable claim for presidency.
The second factor concerns EU membership as a long-standing state policy in
Turkey (almost 50 years), which means that ‘becoming European’ and ‘being
involved in European structures’, have been long-pursued goals, and can be even
traced to the Tanzimat period in the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire
(Karaosmanoğlu 2000). If the AKP aspires to be a mass party of national standing,
it cannot merely pay lip service to the goal of EU membership; in Turkey, Western-
ization, Europeanization and modernization have long been used interchangeably.
This factor signifies the possible domestic and international prestige and credibility
that the AKP would garner by bringing Turkey one step closer to the EU. The
AKP feels that in the event of a settlement on the island, the international embargo
and isolation of Turkish Cypriots would be increasingly difficult to sustain. More
importantly, Turkey would dissolve perhaps one of the most significant barriers on
its journey to EU accession. Although Turkey’s relations with the EU are the low-
est since 2005, the AKP continues to pursue reforms to align its legislation with
the EU acquis. Ankara’s long-awaited dream of joining the EU club has been mir-
rored recently by the words of Turkish president Gül ‘Turkish-EU relations are not
contingent on conjunctural fluctuations of economic life. Membership to the EU is
a strategic goal that Turkey has declared’ (Abdullah Gül 16 September 2011, http://
www.euractiv.com).
The third factor corresponds to EU-related factors, such as the presence and/or
absence of a credible EU membership perspective and an asymmetrical relationship
with the EU during the pre-accession period, bolstered by both conditionality and
the EU linkage policy. Basically, this factor is related to the transformative power































The case of Turkey’s Cyprus policy suggests that once a state achieved
candidacy, rule adoption becomes more unlikely in the absence of conditionality,
the credibility of which is most effectively achieved with the start of accession
negotiations. Later, however, credibility necessitates perpetuating the ultimate
membership perspective, marked by a reasonable and pre-determined period of time
for accession.34 In the Turkish case, there has been too much emphasis on the
‘open-ended’ nature of the talks, on the EU’s ‘absorption capacity’ and on the
possibility of ‘permanent derogations’ in key areas such as free movement of
persons, structural funds and agriculture.35 There have also been various factors
adversely affecting the credibility of the EU membership perspective and thus the
EU’s capacity and potential to influence Turkey’s Cyprus policy. Those factors
embrace both circumstantial and deep-rooted troubles, stemming from the EU’s
institutional structure (complex political bargaining and veto politics); economic
and political crises;36 prominency of debates (focusing more on pressing and exis-
tential matters such as deepening rather than widening) involving the Union’s
future political and institutional vision; a return to discussions of the ‘multi-speed
Europe’ of the early 1990s; prevalent political unwillingness in Europe regarding
Turkey’s membership; and the politicization of the Cyprus question following
Cyprus’ membership.
European Union conditionality’s transformative power has an unwritten aspect
that affects Turkey’s position, particularly its perception regarding the benefits of
Turkey’s EU membership. Notwithstanding the EU’s decision to launch negotia-
tions, perceived unjust aspects of the negotiating terms and other factors related to
the overall pattern of Turkish–EU relations (discussed above) have raised serious
suspicions on the Turkish side with regard to the EU’s sincerity, political will and
credibility. For example, in late 2011, Gül commented that ‘the failure to open new
chapters in Turkey’s negotiating process is harming the 27-nation bloc’s reputation
and it could suffer its biggest loss of credibility in 2012 when Cyprus takes over
the rotating EU presidency in July’.37 Sceptical and somehow hostile statements by
European leaders as to Turkey’s European credentials and membership prospects38
consolidate these suspicions. The credibility of EU conditionality for Turkey is
most likely to be affected by the increasing tendency of some EU members, fore-
most France and the Netherlands, towards basing a decision about Turkey’s EU
membership on the results of national referenda, and by letting arguments against
Turkey’s membership overly occupy the agenda during national and EU Parliament
election campaigns. Moreover, the political discourse of some countries, such as
Germany and Austria, that it is better to offer a ‘Special Status’ to Turkey than full
membership leads many to the impression that even if Turkey fully complies with
the accession criteria, it would still not be offered full membership.
That the relationship between Turkey and the EU is still laden with ambiguities
undermines the perceived benefits of EU membership (for the government). These
developments also pave the way for resentment in a public susceptible to induce-
ments of the Eurosceptic and conservative veto playing wing in Turkey, with their
implications of jeopardizing the legitimacy of the reforms and change.
The asymmetrical relationship between Turkey and the EU since 1999 denotes
that neither temporal factors (only a decade-long and limited participation in the
EU as a candidate) nor the EU’s decision-making system (allowing candidates little
room to manoeuvre) can endow Ankara with an opportunity to upload or gradually
transform its foreign policy via socialization the way a member state can. By






























capitalizing on the EU’s institutional structure and complicated political
bargaining as members of the Union, both Greece and Cyprus have a strong lever
by which to defend their strategic positions in the Cyprus dispute. This situation
increased the degree of asymmetry already embedded in Turkish–EU relations; and
cognizant of that, the AKP government had to take into account the clear message
given by the EU that finding a solution in Cyprus would facilitate Turkey’s
accession process.
A fourth factor involving the government’s cost-benefit calculations relates to
the effect of veto players. Generally speaking, whether domestic policy change is
achieved as a result of conditionality depends not only on government preferences
but also on the existence of veto players, for whom the conditionality and domes-
tic adoption costs are disadvantageous for their relative power positions but
‘whose agreement is necessary for a change in the status quo’ (Tsebelis 2002).
That is, the relevance of veto players for government decision-making emanates
from first, their capability to block, retard or slow the process of change, and
second, the necessity of their ultimate agreement or consent to change in the
status-quo ante.
As a result of the indirect operation of Europeanization in the post-Helsinki per-
iod, different actors have played a part in affecting the government’s decision – in
interaction with the EU – concerning change in the period between 2002 and 2005
and in persistence with and current standstill in Turkish–EU relations since then.
Developing close relations with Europe and full membership in the EU has been
long seen as an ultimate goal by the veto players led by the CHP, MHP, and the
military in Turkey. Ironically, they fear that the EU process of ensuring a country’s
democracy, pluralism, human rights and individual freedoms standards might
endanger the unitary and secular characteristics of the Turkish state. The veto play-
ers are not completely against the idea of membership, but they have a certain level
of distaste for it, particularly for the political conditions of full membership. They
are sceptical of the ‘road’ towards the EU, rather than the ultimate end of ‘EU
membership’. More recently, they have also disagreed with what they consider the
‘unfair’ terms of the negotiations, including open-endedness, long-term membership
prospects, and the ambiguous mix of the conditions and incentives set by the EU.
Therefore, they would like to see the terms changed to reflect their thinking, espe-
cially pertaining to the political criteria regarding the ‘security risks’ involved.
Also, as part of their prevalent state-centric and security-oriented state of mind,
they are reluctant to delegate national sovereignty to a supranational authority like
the EU or to local authorities in the event of membership because both cases would
undermine national autonomy.
Since 2005, the EU’s treatment of Turkey in the Cyprus problem has not only
dampened enthusiasm for accession but also spurred anti-EU nationalist sentiments
in Turkey by preventing the AKP government from taking bold steps towards
implementing the Additional Protocol. Apparently, the decline in domestic support
for the EU prepared a base susceptible to exploitation by the veto players’ statist-
nationalist rhetoric.
After not receiving enough votes in the 1999 elections to be in Parliament, the
CHP became the main opposition party in the November 2002, July 2007 and June
2011 general elections. During negotiations over the Annan Plan between 2002 and
2004, by adopting a state-centred and security-first platform, the CHP carried out a































every occasion, CHP officials harshly criticized the AKP’s commitment to the
Annan Plan as a basis for settlement by pointing out its shortcomings concerning
bizonality, territorial adjustments and Turkey’s guarantorship rights.40 Security con-
siderations and the strategic importance of the island for Turkey provide the basis
for the CHP’s approach towards the Cyprus problem. Despite being at the centre-
left of the political spectrum, in recent years (at least until Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu
assumed the party leadership in May 2010 with a strong social democratic rheto-
ric), the CHP has paradoxically acted as one of the strongest veto players in the
Turkish domestic political landscape, with its continuous effort to boost its electoral
base by capitalizing on rising nationalist and anti-EU feelings. The new leadership’s
stance on Cyprus remained unchanged. Kılıçdaroğlu noted that the Cyprus problem
has become more complicated during AKP government’s tenure and should be
immediately settled through negotiations based on the UN’s proposed bi-communal,
bi-zonal federation composed of two founding states with political equality of the
parties.41
Built around the ideological tenets of nationalism and Turkish–Islamist synthe-
sis, the MHP remained in power between the 1999 and 2002 general elections as
the second major party (after the DSP) and as part of the coalition government
forged between the centre-left DSP and centre-right ANAP.42 After a five-year
absence following the November 2002 elections, it became the third largest party
in both the July 2007 and June 2011 general elections. The MHP is in favour of
the status quo in Cyprus but does not reject a confederal solution based on the
existence of two separate states, as has been propounded by former Turkish Cyp-
riot leader Denktaş and some Turkish state officials since 1998. The MHP has
seriously opposed the EU’s handling of the Cyprus problem, terms of the
accession talks, and the AKP’s support for the Annan Plan. For instance, MHP
leader Devlet Bahçeli termed the EU ‘the main stumbling block for the settle-
ment’ because they allowed Cyprus to join the Union in contravention of interna-
tional law, and concomitantly discouraged Greek Cypriots from settling the
problem (Bahçeli 2002). Bahçeli denounced the government’s policy of relegating
the framework of the solution to the EU (i.e. essentially making it a party to the
conflict) beacuse it would put the solution advocating a bi-communal and bi-
zonal partnership structure composed of the two states, as well as Turkey’s guar-
antorship rights, in complete jeopardy. If this process were to continue, he
warned, ‘our national survival will suffer’ (Bahçeli 2009, 33–5). Having secured
itself as pro-establishment with its strong Euro-sceptic, ‘security and state-first’
tone, the MHP balances the government’s pro-change and pro-EU policies,
although mirrors the EU’s own ambiguity over Turkey’s eventual membership
and Cyprus policy.
Despite being the vanguard of Westernization and holding a long-standing aim
of membership in European institutions (including the EU), the Turkish army is
believed by many to be involved in the country’s anti-EU coalition, largely because
of its guardianship role and focus on securing a secular and unitary state. For the
military, the need for a presence on the northern part of the island has been accom-
panied by a strategic dimension since the mid-1990s, with the looming prospect of
Cyprus becoming an EU member before Turkey. During the post-Helsinki reform
process, rather than acting as a totally rejectionist veto player vocally opposing the
idea of settlement in Cyprus altogether, the military acknowledged the primacy of
civilian authorities and political responsibility on Cyprus, and preferred to share its






























reservations about the Annan Plan with the government through the National
Security Council (NSC). For example, the ‘red lines’ of the military concerning
undiluted bizonality, maintenance of Turkey’s guarantorship rights, and ensuring in
a peace plan that derogations (i.e. freedom of movement and freedom of settlement,
among others) become part of EU primary law, were articulated in a meeting of the
NSC on 5 April 2004. Given their emphasis on the island’s geographical proximity
and the strategic importance of defending Turkey’s southern borders on the one
hand, and the freedoms and lives of Turkish Cypriots on the other, the military
elites are wary of the EU’s stance on the grounds that the latter has failed to stand
at an equal distance from the parties to the dispute. One of the major faultlines
between the military and the government concerned the former’s opposition to the
Erdoğan’s view that the Annan Plan could be accepted as it was. Between 2002
and 2003, the military elite backed Denktaş’ leadership in contrast to dissociation
of the AKP government from his negotiating position. Once inter-communal negoti-
ations collapsed in March 2003, the government began to realize that revisions to
the Plan would be necessary (Akşit and Melakopides 2008, 9). Hence, despite an
initial veto, the military establishment reluctantly endorsed the Annan Plan as a ref-
erence for negotiations and paved the way for a change in Turkey’s Cyprus policy
at the NSC meeting on 23 January 2004. Its consent to that change was only mate-
rialized in view of its sensitivity over the prospect of long-term political stability
and fulfilment of long-term foreign policy goals (Akşit and Melakopides 2008).
Increasingly devoid of its policy-shaping power in line with the political transfor-
mation induced by the EU accession process, particularly since 2005, the military
has adopted a relatively low-profile position and even reconciled with the govern-
ment over its determination to end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots in interna-
tional fora, denouncing the EU for its failure to reward Turkish Cypriots’
consensual attitude towards the Annan Plan (Robins 2007, 298), pledging support
to the new negotiation process for a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus prob-
lem revitalized by Erdoğan’s 2008,43 and supporting the government’s post-2011
election rhetoric that Turkish Cypriots and Turkey would go their own way in case
of a non-solution in 2012.44
Although they seemed unable to reverse or block the processes of change, the
MHP, the CHP, and to a lesser extent the military, could slow it by playing on ris-
ing nationalist sentiments in Turkish society largely as a response to the perceived
vagueness and double standards of the EU vis-à-vis Turkish membership and the
Cyprus problem. The current standstill between Turkey and the EU resulted from
the suspension of talks; due to the resentment it created in the public and veto
players alike, the AKP government declined to implement the Additional Protocol
because the adaptation cost for full compliance would alienate its electoral
constituency (i.e. too much opposition from the veto players). Ironically, when the
government’s re-strategization of the Cyprus issue (a return to the two state solution
offered by Denktaş), and its message to the EU that relations would be suspended
in the event of Cyprus’ EU presidency are considered together, it can be argued
that the rhetorical disparity between the government and the veto players dimin-
ished substantially. Although the AKP apparently consolidated its domestic political
power vis-à-vis its opponents in the post-2011 election period, the upcoming
agenda of drafting a new constitution and thus the need for a compromise with

































This article intends to shed light on how the Europeanization process takes place in
the context of enlargement by providing empirical findings as to the EU’s potential
to influence the foreign policies of candidate countries. Built upon the analytical
toolkit of Europeanization, it deals with the question of how the EU commands a
change in candidate states’ foreign policies. It particularly analyses the extent of
the EU’s impact on Turkey’s Cyprus policy.
A more specific attempt is directed towards understanding the relationship
between domestic political pressures and foreign policy choices by the AKP gov-
ernment concerning the Cyprus problem. This study argues that how domestic
actors perceive the credibility of EU conditionality and the accession perspective
should be regarded as significant because how the accession perspective and condi-
tionality establish those actors in domestic power struggles affects how power is
redistributed among them. Therefore, the EU’s potential in transforming candidate
countries’ foreign policies should be critically assessed.
Once the implications of EU conditionality for Turkey’s Cyprus policy case are
analysed, the ‘Europeanizing’ potential of the EU seems questionable. Notwith-
standing the Cyprus issue being nearly a political condition, Greek and Greek Cyp-
riot pressures, and Turkey’s 50-year bid for membership, one can observe that the
EU has not been able to transform45 the policy but only managed to generate a
‘limited, superficial, and short-lived’ change between 2002 and 2005 on an issue
predominantly characterized by strategical priority, solidarity, and nationalist senti-
ments. To reiterate, the nature and extent of change have been confined to support
for a federalist solution that was crystallized by the Annan Plan and obtained
acceptance at the level of the Turkish NSC and the Turkish Cypriot leadership; and
to pursuing a win-win and consensual foreign policy to show the international com-
munity that Turks are not intransigent. During that period, the EU’s linkage policy,
the enthusiasm of the Erdoğan government in getting a date from Brussels for
accession talks, and the desire to solve the Cyprus problem prior to Cyprus’ EU
membership, appeared to be responsible for a change in the Cyprus policy. From
the perspective of the Turkish army, there seemed to be a reluctant collaboration –
notwithstanding the caution and reservations attached – with the AKP government.
Particularly, during the last phase of the Cyprus negotiations in Bürgenstock (Swit-
zerland), senior military officers were incorporated in the process alongside diplo-
mats at all stages, but most notably during discussions on security and on the
Treaty of Guarantee and Alliance.46 Moreover, as a facilitating actor, TÜSİAD’s
pro-EU lobbying activities concerning the Cyprus issue had a direct impact on
shaping public opinion in Turkey in favour of reaching an agreement with Greek
Cypriots. TÜSİAD also had an indirect impact by weakening Denktaş’ position by
claiming him to be a ‘pro-status quo stumbling block on the way to a settlement’.
Conversely, since 2005, it has been recognized that EU-related factors more
intensively interacted with Turkey’s domestic factors, and that domestic consider-
ations have played a dominant role in circumventing the AKP government, as a
‘political’ actor, from making a radical change in Cyprus policy. At the same time,
the Turkish case suggests that, unless accompanied by a credible membership per-
spective and even-handed policies towards the parties to a dispute, the EU’s ability
to change policy in the pre-accession period, which is underpinned by the very
coercive nature of Europeanization, is eroded. It has been observed that the EU’s






























credibility was undermined in domestic public opinion with two consequences
building on each other: triggering scepticism towards the EU in public and playing
into veto players’ hands. The government was thus barred from implementing the
Additional Protocol in full, from agreeing swiftly to a settlement plan in concur-
rence with Greek Cypriot demands in the rejuvenated inter-communal talks on the
island since 2008, and from recognizing Cyprus to comply with EU conditionality.
In the latter period, the politicization of the problem by the EU has been attended
by ‘legalization’ involving ‘contractual obligations’ on Turkey’s part. Despite coer-
cive top-down pressures from the EU, the pace and extent of Europeanization have
been relatively determined by endogenous factors, thereby signifying ‘nationally
directed and limited Europeanization’ in the Turkish case. Put differently, the EU-
dominated factors, emanating mostly from its institutional structure and lack of
political will, have been largely overriden by domestic considerations, which in turn
appear to be responsible for the current standstill in Turkish–EU relations. Also, it
shows that the pattern of EU’s impact in the framework of Europeanization is not
unidimensional and homogeneous. Although governments are the key actors in
deciding ultimate policy changes, variables including the unfavourable domestic
political atmosphere, shifting attitudes of the electoral constituency and increasing
opposition of the plurality of actors in government foreign policy may well create a
contextual political risk for governments at home.
Regarding Turkish–EU relations in the context of the Cyprus issue, it can be
argued that since 2005, and continuing with the AKP’s hawkish and self-confident
tone after the June 2011 elections, the leverage and Europeanizing impact of the
EU on Turkey has seemed to diminish. This has especially been the case in acces-
sion negotiations coming to a deadlock, candidate state perceptions of a lack of EU
credibility, epidemic economic and political crises in many member states, financial
problems in the Eurozone, enduring political disinclination in Brussels to revitalize
Turkish–EU relations and the eclipsing of the enlargement debate by the EU’s more
immediate internal problems. Viewed in this light, it may appear that the more the
pace of accession negotiations between the EU and the candidate state slows and
relations worsen, the more the latter tends to show nationalist reflexes and pursue
independent policies. In Turkey, those EU-related variables are accompanied by
post-2011 domestic ones, such as power consolidation of the AKP government vis-
à-vis veto players, a well-performing economy, and an expanding regional role and
foreign policy activism. Turkish–EU relations have certainly been nebulous since
2005, but what we have observed that relations pass through a ‘circumstantial’ cri-
sis period. The Turkish government needs wide societal consensus to change pol-
icy, including consensus from the veto-playing Euro-sceptics and those in pro-EU
circles, as well as a persistent democratization process and EU-induced reforms not
only for the sake of the domestic political calculations of new constitution and
presidency elections but also to retain its sphere of influence and attractiveness as a
regional power. It is at this juncture that attachment to the EU anchor and continua-
tion of a credible membership perspective are key in fulfilling those ends. More-
over, EU-originating investments play a significant role behind Turkey’s
breathtaking economic growth in the last two years (8.5% in 2010 and 2011, and
3.1% in the first half of 2012). As Egemen Bağış, then-Turkish Minister for EU
Affairs put it, ‘(…) assume that the EU is our dietician. You may get angry with
your dietician and and you may not even find her symphatetic at all. (B)ut if the































Turkish government towards the EU should be perceived as a circumstantial reac-
tion to the dietician, not to her prescription. Given another statement from Bağış
that ‘Turkey will never abandon Cyprus for the EU, nor the EU for Cyprus,’48 it is
most likely that the Cyprus problem and Turkey’s accession to the EU will be
viewed together in the foreseeable future, continuing to determine one another.
Acknowledgements
The author is indebted to Prof Dr Mustafa Kibaroğlu, Prof Dr Ali Tekin and Dr Burcu Sarı
Karademir for their invaluable comments and suggestions on the earlier drafts of this article.
Notes
1. Börzel and Risse (2003) call them as multiple veto points and formal facilitating
institutions. For further information about veto players see also Héritier et al. (2001).
For formal facilitating institutions, see Caporaso and Jupille (2001).
2. Another variance of neo-institutionalist theory underpinning Europeanization is histori-
cal institutionalism. It seeks to know why a certain choice was made and why a certain
outcome occurred by examining the historical evidence. It argues that political events
happen within a historical context, which has a direct consequence on decisions or
events. Its emphasis on ‘critical junctures’ as moments of radical change that constitute
a breaking point at which historical development moves onto a new path, and its par-
ticular method of ‘path dependency’ would be helpful in tracing the cycles of continu-
ity and change (though not radical one) in Turkey’s Cyprus policy. I would like to
thank one of the anonymous referees for raising this point.
3. For example, based on intergovernmental cooperation, foreign and security policy is a
domain where national governments are key actors, allowing only limited involvement
of the Commission and the European Parliament and where Community law is not
prominent.
4. Those constraints include existence of divergent signals by the European Parliament,
the Commission and member states embedded during pre-accession period; methodo-
logical challenge in pinpointing the net EU impact from other domestic and global
processes for change. See Börzel (2003), Major (2005, 175–90), Grabbe (2001).
5. Rather than affecting the substance and content of policy change, top-down European-
ization is more evident in policy styles, policy rhetoric and the institutional and organi-
zational making of foreign policy. For Greece, see Economides (2005); for France, see
Wong (2006), for Britain, see Bache and Jordan (2006).
6. Most probably owing to the EU membership of Greece and Cyprus.
7. Beginning with the Regular Report and Accession Partnership of 2006, the EU began
to handle Cyprus under the sub-section of ‘regional issues and international
obligations’ (again as part of enhanced political dialogue and political criteria).
8. Specifically, UNSC 649/90; UNSC 716/92; UNSC 750/92; UNSC 774/92; UNSC
1251/99.
9. Denoting the political and military situation before the Turkish military intervention in
1974.
10. Rauf Denktaş, founding president of the TRNC, personal interview of the author, 24
May 2010, Lefkoşa, Northern Cyprus.
11. An anonymous career diplomat responsible for Cyprus affairs at the Turkish Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, personal interview of the author, 3 June 2010, Ankara, Turkey.
12. In this study, ‘Cyprus’ denotes the ‘Republic of Cyprus’ which has not been recog-
nized by Turkey, formally calling it the ‘Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus’.
13. According to the Luxembourg European Council’s Presidency Conclusions, a political
solution should be found ‘under the aegis of the UN (…) with a view to creating a
bi-zonal, bi-communal federation’ (EU Council, Presidency Conclusions, Luxembourg,
12–13 December 1997, paragraph 28).






























14. The then-EC was trying to stand at an equal distance in the Greek-Turkish disputes,
taking into account the Cold War political conditions.
15. Designed primarily to protect British privileges and Turkish Cypriots’ economic rights,
Article 5 of the Agreement stipulated that ‘The rules governing trade between the con-
tracting parties may not give rise to any discrimination between the member states or
between nationals or companies of these states or nationals and companies of Cyprus’.
See Brewin 2000, 23.
16. The original text can be found on the official website of the Turkish Ministry of For-
eign Affairs. http://www.mfa.gov.tr.
17. Those chapters cover Free Movement of Goods, Right of Establishment and Freedom
to Provide Services, Financial Services, Agriculture and Rural Development, Fisheries,
Transport Policy, Customs Union and External Relations.
18. Murat Karayalçın, former Foreign Minister of Turkey, personal interview of the author,
29 June 2010, Ankara, Turkey.
19. The London and Zurich Accords as the offspring of the Republic of Cyprus refer to
three agreements: (1) the Treaty of Establishment, which defines the territory of the
Republic of Cyprus; (2) the Treaty of Alliance, by which Turkey, Greece and Cyprus
agree to cooperate in their common defence and (3) the Treaty of Guarantee by which
Cyprus undertakes to uphold the 1960 Constitution and Turkey, Great Britain and
Greece guarantee Cyprus’ independence and territorial integrity.
20. Suat Kınıklıoğlu, then-AKP deputy, personal interview of the author, 3 June 2010,
Ankara, Turkey; Serdar Denktaş, leader of the Democrat Party and former foreign min-
ister of the TRNC, personal interview of the author, 24 May 2010, Lefkoşa, Northern
Cyprus.
21. Also known as the ‘Basis for Agreement on a Comprehensive Settlement of the
Cyprus Problem’, the Plan prepared by then-UN Secretary General Kofi Annan aimed
at ending the division of the island before its accession. It was presented on 11
November 2002 and went through four sets of adjustments to take into account the
points of both parties. The Plan proposed a Swiss-style confederation and a
Belgian-type federation under the name of the United Cyprus Republic, with a rotating
presidency and two component states that were to share sovereignty. It also called for
a single sovereignty and international legal personality with partition and secession
prohibited. It would have established a limited right to return between the territories of
the two communities, and would have allowed Turkey and Greece to maintain a
military presence, though with phased reductions in troop numbers.
22. Serdar Denktaş, personal interview of the author, 24 May 2010, Lefkoşa, Northern
Cyprus.
23. For example, then-AKP Foreign Minister, Yaşar Yakış noted that ‘we told the Europe-
ans that granting Turkey a date for inauguration of negotiations [at the Copenhagen
summit on 12 December 2002], could compel us to rethink our policy over ESDP and
Cyprus’ [author’s translation]. 2002. Cumhuriyet.
24. As compensation for the rejection of the UN-sponsored Annan Plan by the Greek Cyp-
riots, the Commission adopted three different regulations: the Green Line Regulation,
the Aid Regulation, and the Direct Trade Regulation. So far, the third one has not been
implemented due to the Greek Cypriot veto. Nonetheless, these regulations are only
partial compensation for the relevant economic backwardness of the Turkish Cypriots.
What is significant for the Turkish side is the opening of Ercan Airport in Northern
Cyprus to direct flights as well as the formal espousal of this move by Greek Cypriots.
25. Votes for the AKP have steadily increased from 34.28% in the November 2002 parlia-
mentary elections to 46.47% in July 2007 and to 49.9% in July 2011 elections.
26. ‘Erdoğan: ‘Bıçak Kemiğe Dayanmak Üzere’’ [It is no longer tolerable]. 2011. Hürriyet,
July 20. However, Egemen Bağış, Minister for EU Affairs, said in an interview with
the daily Kıbrıs Gazetesi that while Ankara will keep relations with the European
Commission, European Parliament and candidate states intact, it will ignore the Greek
Cypriot Administration. Interview with Eylem Eraydın. 2012. Kıbrıs Gazetesi, March
3.
27. See ‘Half-country to lead miserable union’. 2011. Today’s Zaman, November 22; ‘Sefil
































accessed 24 November 24, 2011. Bağış went even further, to warn that options of set-
tlement in Cyprus involve reunification, a two-state solution and annexation of North-
ern Cyprus into Turkey. 2012. Kıbrıs Gazetesi, March 3.
28. Derviş Eroğlu, ‘Müzakere Süreci Başarısız Oldu’ [Negotiation Process Has Failed].
2012. http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25337458/, April 6; accessed, April 7, 2012.
29. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, ‘Kıbrıs’ta Ban Ki Moon Planı Oluşturalım’ [Let’s Prepare a
Ban Ki Moon Plan in Cyprus]. 2013. http://www.abhaber.com, November 7; acessed
13, November 13, 2013.
30. Derviş Eroğlu, ‘Yıl sonuna kadar ana konularda anlaşma sağlanabilir’ [Agreement
would be reached on basic issues by the end of the year]. 2013. http://www.cnnturk.com,
September 29; accessed, September 10, 2013.
31. For example see Sami Kohen ‘Ankara Denktaş’ın çizgisine geliyor’ [Ankara gets clo-
ser to Denktaş’ line]. 2012. Milliyet, January 17; Yalçın Doğan ‘Annan gibi müstehcen
kelimeleri kullanma’ [Do not use nasty words like Annan]. 2012. Hürriyet, January
17; Asım Akansoy ‘Eski Türk tezlerine dönüş’ [Return to the former Turkish thesis].
2011. Kıbrıs Postası, January 17.
32. Eurobarometer National Reports on Turkey confirm that ‘[f]or Turks, the EU means,
first and foremost, economic prosperity.’
33. The research was conducted by the A&G Research Company on 28 April 2008. More
detailed information can be attained from http://www.agarastirma.com.tr/pdfler/abye-
uyelik-anketi.pdf.
34. While Strategy Paper (2008–2009) states that ‘Accession negotiations with Turkey are
a long-term process’, the Negotiating Framework document stipulates that ‘With a
view to the establishment of a Financial Framework, negotiations could not be con-
cluded for the period from 2014’.
35. The ‘open-ended’ and long-term nature of the accession process was especially noted
by the 2004 Commission Progress Report and Recommendation on Turkey, Negotiat-
ing Framework document and Strategy Papers (of 2005 and 2008–2009). For example,
the Strategy Paper of 2005 explicitly emphasized that the pace of enlargement must
take into account the EU’s capacity to absorb new members.
36. For example, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé, in his speech before European Par-
liament’s Foreign Relations Commission on 16 February 2012, considered Turkey a
‘challenge’ for the EU and stated that ‘our economic crisis confirmed that our political
project intended for the EU would be unable to survive the accession of such a
weighted country like Turkey’. http://www.abhaber.com/haber.php?id=38937; accessed
17 February 2012.
37. ‘Sefil Birliğe Yarım Başkan’ [Half-Country Leading a Miserable Union], http://www.
cnnturk.com/2011/guncel/11/23/sefil.birlige.yarim.baskan/637736.0/index.html; accessed
24 November 2011.
38. For example French President Nicolas Sarkozy asserted that ‘I am in favor of signing
a contract with Turkey. I am in favor of a joint market with Turkey. But I am against
Turkey’s integration into Europe. Turkey is a small Asia. And there is no reason for it
to be a part of Europe… Turkey is a great civilization; but not a European one’
(quoted in Müftüler-Baç 2008, 66). Further, statements in some EU circles (led by
France) as to the ‘need to redefine EU’s borders’ or that ‘absorption capacity’ should
be taken into account in future enlargements fuelled already existing sensitivities in
Turkish public opinion.
39. In fact, the 1974 military intervention of Turkey was conducted during then-CHP lea-
der and PM Bülent Ecevit’s tenure.
40. For example, see then-deputy chairman and former ambassador Onur Öymen’s state-
ment published in daily Cumhuriyet on 18 January 2003. Also see the views of the
former ambassador and Istanbul deputy of the CHP Şükrü Elekdağ written in Yankı
Dergisi [Yankı Journal] on 1 May 2009.
41. ‘Kılıçdaroğlu’ndan Kıbrıs Mesajı’ [A Message from Kılıçdaroğlu on Cyprus]. 2011.
Hurriyet, July 20.
42. It was at the time of coalition government of the DSP-MHP-ANAP that Turkey
attained candidacy status.






























43. For example, the NSC meetings dated 30 December 2008 and 24 April 2008
buttressed the new process but reiterated that any solution should be based on bizonali-
ty; existence of two distinct peoples; political equality of the two parties; equal status
of two founding states; establishment of a new partnership state; and continuation of
Turkey’s effective and virtual guarantees.
44. Exceptions to the compatible attitude of the military included the government’s Action
Plan in January 2006 to open Turkey’s harbours and airports to Greek Cypriot sea ves-
sels and aircrafts in return for opening the Northern Cypriot sea ports of Gazimagosa,
Girne and Gemikonağı to international traffic, and Ercan Airport to direct flights. Yaşar
Büyükanıt, Chief of General Staff portrayed the government’s decision as ‘a departure
from the state’s official policy’ and a ‘surprise’ (Akşit and Melakopides 2008, 10).
The military also openly criticized Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat’s initiative
to open up the intersection of Lokmacı/Ledra Street in Lefkoşa in 2007, which was
located in the forbidden military zone, on the grounds that such steps should be taken
reciprocally (Akşit and Melakopides 2008, 10).
45. Meanwhile, ‘expected transformation’ denotes more precisely the implementation of
the Additional Protocol in full, agreeing swiftly to a settlement plan consistent with
Greek Cypriot demands made in the rejuvenated inter-communal talks on the island
that have taken place since 2008, or even recognition of the ‘Republic of Cyprus’ in
full compliance with EU conditionality.
46. An anonymous top-level diplomat in the Presidency of the TRNC, personal interview
of the author, 24 May 2010, Lefkoşa, Northern Cyprus.
47. Egemen Bağış, interview with Demet Cengiz Bilgin. 2011. Hurriyet, 11 December.
48. Egemen Bağış. 2011. http://www.euractiv.com, January 27; accessed 20 September
2011.
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